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SHG-Bank Linkage in India in the third Millennium 
K. R. Pillai, Professor, School of Management, Manipal University  
Abstract 
India embraced financial inclusion as a major macroeconomic reform initiative to 
amplify the social approach of banking even in the era of privatisation of banking and 
finance. The SHG-Bank linkage programme is trying to build partnership between an 
entrepreneurial class and repository of finance. A growing country like India, with 
perceptible rural-urban divide, has ample potential to develop and nurture 
entrepreneurial culture. Bank nationalisation gave an impetus to the social approach of 
banking. The broad based role of financial inclusion is possible only through the focus 
oriented partnership of government, banking institutions, RBI, NGOs, MFIs and SHGs. 
The present paper reviews the SHG-Bank linkage programme during 2001 to 2010 in 
Indian perspective.  
Key Words: financial inclusion, micro-credit, micro finance, NABARD, pro-
poor banking, SHG-Bank Linkage.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Bank nationalization, a trailblazer for banking with a humane face, was the first organised 
effort to bring unbanked areas to a banking embedded system. The impact of social approach 
of banking was impressively exceptional with phenomenal branch expansion and banking 
access to rural poor. The Self-Help Group (SHG) -Bank (S-B) linkage programme was 
conceived to fill the gap existing in the formal financial network and extending the outreach 
of banking to the poor (Kumar & Golait, 2009). Nationalization paved the way for 
conditioning the level playing field for a social approach to banking by instituting ceiling on 
interest rates, targeted deployment of credit, sectoral allocation of funds etc. Despite many 
supply side initiatives such as nationalization of banks, targeted priority lending, differential 
rate of interest scheme and the concept of regional Rural Banks, the underprivileged strata of 
the Indian society remained excluded from the formal banking support. The corridors of 
formal banking system were considerably unfamiliar to socially and economically vulnerable 
sections of the population due to their ‘conferred untouchabilities’.   
The concept SHG had been floated as an effective solution to poverty reduction. A small 
group of neighbourhood households can calibrate more group dynamics and impose effective 
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self-discipline, there by a perfect synergy can be attained through collective group strength 
and empowerment. The basic premise of SHG is the mobilisation of money by 
infusing/developing regular habits of thrift. Due to its collective responsibility, borrowed 
money can also be used effectively. Savings plus credit is said to be a good starting point for 
group formation called SHG (Karmakar, 1999). As Karmakar (1999) aptly remarks that 
SHGs are mostly informal groups of people where members pool their savings and relend in 
the group on rotational basis, depending upon consumption, production or investment needs. 
It had been perceived that the SHGs would act as catalysts for better credit delivery and 
recovery by closely monitoring ultimate beneficiaries through a principle of mutual role 
modeling and peer coercion.  
In its report of the pilot project, NABARD (1995) clearly delineates its objective of S-B 
linkage programme as “to evolve supplementary credit strategies for meeting the credit needs 
of the poor by combining the flexibility, sensitivity, responsiveness of informal credit system 
with the strength of technical and administrative capabilities and financial resources of the 
formal credit institutions.” In this backdrop, the present paper reviews the S-B programme 
initiated in India during the early period of this century. 
BRIEF HISTORY 
When we trace the history of enabling the vast section at the bottom of the population 
pyramid with access to banking services, we may come across certain milestones that 
occurred precisely in decadal gaps. With bank nationalization as the harbinger of social 
approach the banking in 1969, the year 1972 was much celebrated in the history of credit 
access to poor people, when differential rate of interest system was announced. The scheme 
was to make bank nationalization initiative more effective by ensuring the credit service 
percolate down the eligible and needy people. Under the scheme it was mandated to every 
nationalized bank to set a targeted of lending of one per cent of their total advances 
outstanding at the end of the previous year. Later NABARD was launched in the year 1982, 
as a broad based organisation at the apex level to extend support and give guidance to credit 
institutions in matters relating to the formulation and implementation of rural development 
programmes (Datt & Sundaram, 1998). It is well reckoned that mandate of NABARD is 
holistic by converting isolated rural credit into a wider rural development perspective. As 
furtherance to the focus of rural development, the SHG-Bank linkage programme, as a pilot 
project, was introduced in 1992, which has become a topic of the present study. The S – B 
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linkage programme was started as an action research project in 1989, which was the off-
shoot of NABARD initiative, during 1987, through sanctioning Rs. 10 lakh to MYRADA 
Foundation as seed money for experimenting credit management groups (NABARD, 2008).  
The S-B linkage model was introduced as an experimental project during 1991-’92 for 
enabling more banking reach to the needy and poor. It was expected to develop a 
supplementary credit delivery system to reach the poor in a cost-effective and sustainable 
manner (Karmakar, 1999), addressing the multifarious needs of saving, consumption, 
production and investment needs of the target group. The primary objective of the 
programme was to facilitate the poor and otherwise neglected people to have access to formal 
banking system and, thereby, enable them to obtain substantial livelihoods. The programme 
started with a low profile and gained rapid strides from 1998 onwards (NABARD, 2008). 
Greatly enchanted with the success of the initiative, The NABARD intensified the 
programme so as to improve the outreach of the formal banking system in a cost-effective 
manner. The aim was to enhance the quality of credit in rural areas and promote people’s 
participation in self-help group and grass root institutions.  
It would also be essential to mention another historic initiative of the central government in 
the 1980s by announcing the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) to address 
the financial needs of the vulnerable sections in the rural areas. Despite its wide coverage and 
reach in the rural landscape, there was a vast unmet gap (Sreekantaradhya, 2004).  
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Upholding the capacity of SHG-Bank partnership to develop an efficient and effective 
alternative credit delivery and management system, Karmakar (1999) airs the concern of 
finding an adequate number of committed bankers and NGOs to carry forward the system. 
The research presents a few successful cases of linkage programme from Orissa. The study 
finds that if linkage between SHGs, banks and NGOs are usefully built, transaction cost will 
be lower for both banks and borrowers. Sreekandaradhya (2004) observes that SHG-Bank 
linkage programme compatibly co-exists with conventional pro-poor approach of 
commercial banking policies. The study indicates that the concept of micro-credit system 
was introduced as an alternative approach to the social banking dimension of IRDP, which 
was beset with various issues such as lack of effective credit delivery, identification of 
eligible beneficiaries, erosion of credit discipline, repayment ethics, credit diversification etc. 
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he underscores that the new initiative for poor-friendly credit dispensation has several merits 
over government sponsored and subsidy oriented programmes and undoubtedly the most 
appropriate, which needs to be greatly strengthened to meet the banking needs of the poor.   
Evoking the significance of banking and financial re-engineering in the Indian scenario, 
Kumar and Golait (2009) deplore that the physical out reach of the rural credit has not been 
effective in achieving income expansion and poverty reduction, access to needed financial 
services still persists an issue in the rural areas. Studies (Sreekantaradhya, 2004;   NABARD, 
2008) have observed that the saving potential and credit-worthiness of economically weaker 
sections can be enhanced, if proper approach is developed.  
METHODOLOGY 
The research followed a descriptive approach to the trends in the progress of SHG-Bank 
linkage programme initiated by NABARD to ensure the reach of timely and cost-effective 
banking and financial services to those who are badly in need of such facilities. The study 
was quantitative in nature. The major data support comprised of annual quantitative date 
pertaining to the number of SHGs financed by NABARD, the amount of loan disbursed to 
SHGs and the amount disbursed under refinance scheme covering 1999-’00 to 2009 – ’10. 
The required data were obtained from the various issues of Economic Review.  
The percentage annual growth rate of each data set was estimated to decipher the year-on-
year growth trend of the variables identified for the study. Trend line of each variable was 
also plotted for an easy comprehension. A theoretical model has also been formulated based 
on the approach paper of NABARD (1995) on SHG-Bank linkage programme.  
SHG- BANK LINKAGE MODEL 
NABARD had proposed three alternative models of S - B linkage programme. Commercial 
banks were given the liberty to attempt any alternative befitting to the operational feasibility 
of their locality.  
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TRENDS IN SGH-BANK LINKAGE PROGRAMME IN THE LAST 
DECADE 
For analysing the trends of S-B linkage programme in the third millennium, the data 
regarding the number of SHGs covered, the total amount advanced to them and the of 
refinance were presented in table 1.  
Table 1 
Trends in SHG-Bank Linkage Programme in India  
Year 
No. of 
SHGs 
(Lakh) 
% 
growth 
Amount 
disbursed 
(Rs. Crore) 
% 
growth 
Refinance 
extended 
(Rs. Crore) 
 
% 
growth 
1999 - 00 0.8178 -- 136 -- 98.04  -- 
2000 - 01 1.49 82.19 288 111.76 250.61  155.62 
2001 - 02 1.98 32.88 545 89.24 395.76  57.92 
2002 - 03 2.56 29.29 1020 87.16 622.30  57.24 
2003 - 04 3.62 41.41 1858 82.16 705.40  13.35 
2004 - 05 5.39 48.89 2994 61.14 967.80  37.20 
2005 - 06 6.2 15.03 4499 50.27 1067.70  10.32 
2006 - 07 11.06 78.39 6570 46.03 1292.86  21.09 
2007 - 08 12.28 11.03 8849 34.69 1615.50  24.96 
2008 - 09 16.09 31.03 12257 38.51 2620.03  62.18 
2009 - 10 15.87 -1.37 14453 17.92 3173.56  21.13 
Source: Economic Survey, various issues 
Figure 1: Models of SHG – Bank Linkage Programme 
Commercial Banks 
NGO 
SHG 
1 
SHG 
2 
SHG 
3 
SHG SHG 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
1 1 2 2 
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The table discloses that the financial year 2000 – ’01 experienced the highest growth rate 
consistently for the three data sets. The highest average growth rate is displayed by the 
amount advanced by NABARD for the programme. The three data sets recorded a positive 
enduring growth rate except in the year 2009 – ’10, where the growth rate of SHG coverage 
registered a marginal negative growth. However, the other two sets have recorded 
comfortable positive growth rate, signifying the outreach of fresh credit and refinance 
support to the target groups. These trends have been restated in the following figures. The 
growth trends in amount advanced exhibit a smooth growth path. But other two display 
certain step-like upward movements for certain years.  
DISCUSSION  
The S-B linkage programme has been trying to build partnership between an entrepreneurial 
class and repository of finance. A growing country like India, with perceptual rural-urban 
divide, has ample potential to develop and nurture entrepreneurial culture. In this regard the 
lending institutions have additional responsibilities such developing viable business models, 
offering consultancy services, extending monitoring support, facilitating markets etc., in 
addition to being a lender. The success of linkage model depends upon the guarantor system 
for loan disbursement, where joint liability has been a substitute to physical collateral 
(Karmakar, 1999) 
The scope of this partnership is impressively high as micro, small and medium enterprises 
have obtained a privileged position in the development model of India for quite some time. 
The income and employment generation potential of small and medium enterprises has been 
well-reckoned with in the wake of collapse of giant business edifices.  
It is widely understood that S-B linkage programme is effective in realizing financial 
inclusion, which is a sin qua non of inclusive growth agenda of the country. The habit of 
thrift and prudential spending can be promoted through group norms and self-imposed or 
peer-pressured moral suasion. Hence the mobilisation of saving is successful through 
trickling down principle. Credit delivery by banks will be more efficient by lending to SHGs 
than to individuals, and the former has economies of size and scale. The credit repayment 
mechanism is impeccable in the linkage model, as the members can exert moral pressure on 
their peer members, which, in turn, leads to better circulation of funds. One of the distinctive 
features of this linkage programme has been a very high on-time recovery (NABARD, 2006).  
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Taking cognizance of the proximity of microfinance institutions (MFIs) to SHGs, the RBI 
has recently allowed the former to mobilize funds through external commercial borrowing up 
to $ 10 million or equivalent during a financial year for permitted end use under the 
automatic route, aiming to strengthen the MFIs in the long run. It has been stipulated that the 
amount floated should strictly be used for lending to SHGs and for bona-fide microfinance 
activities, including capacity building programmes.  
CONCLUSION 
In fact, the S-B linkage programme enabled partnership between formal and informal 
institutional set up based on the philosophy of ‘trickle-down’ theory. The initiative has been 
well received in the Indian banking and rural landscape, which has been corroborated by the 
phenomenal growth of the linkage programme. Driven by the goal of thrift promotion among 
the economically weaker sections of the social strata, the SHGs are meticulous in addressing 
the genuine credit requirements of their members on time in a cost-effective manner. Since 
the mode of repayment is informal and mutually agreeable, with an unrelenting tag of peer 
pressure, almost cent percent repayment is ensured. The veritable success of linkage 
programme confirms the credit-worthiness of poor and marginalised people.  
Despite remarkable progress in S-B linkage programme, a glaring defect is its locational 
dispersion in terms of spread and loan disbursement. The NABARD (2006) points out that 
the regional coverage of S-B linkage programmes is not uniform, characterized by the visible 
dearth of financial services to certain deprived areas. The southern states in the country still 
out-pace the other regions pertaining to the linkage programme. Civil societies play vital role 
in materializing the linkage programme. MYRADA, Dhan Foundation, SEWA, PRADAN 
etc. are plausible evidences.  
The programme can ideally realise the development agenda of financial inclusion, but issue 
that remains unresolved is the pro-activeness and/or accommodative response of formal 
banking system. This programme ushers joint liability to ensure the repayment of loans 
obtained through banks. The SHG mechanism is able to induce peer monitoring by restricting 
the number of borrowers that borrow simultaneously in the group (Aniket, 2006). The 
inclusive growth strategy of government of India will be efficacious only through ample 
coverage of financial inclusion. As for that matter to happen the banking system in the 
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country is expected to play a crucial role by prioritizing the grass-root democratic 
institutions.  
As furtherance to women empowerment and promotion of their SHGs, a proposal has been 
mooted in the budget 2011 – 12 to create a ‘Women’s SHG Development Fund’ with a 
corpus of RS. 500 crore.  
REFERENCES  
Aniket, K. 2006. Self Help Group Linkage Programme: A case Study, available at 
www.http//aniket.co.uk/research/casestudy.pdf, accessed on 25/11/2011 
Datt, R. & Sundaram, K. P. M. 1998. Indian Economy, 38
th
 revised edn. New Delhi: S. 
Chnad & Company Ltd. 
GoI. 2004. The Economic Survey. New Delhi: Government of India 
GoI. 2008. The Economic Survey. New Delhi: Government of India 
GoI. 2011. The Economic Survey. New Delhi: Government of India 
NABARD. 1995. Linking Self-Help Goups with Banks – An Indian Experience. Bombay: 
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
NABARD. 2006. Annual Report. Bombay: National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
NABARD. 2008. Annual Report. Bombay: National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development 
Karmakar, K. G. 1999. Rural Credit and Self Help Groups: Micro-finance needs and 
concepts in India. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Kumar, P. & Golait, R. 2009. Bank Penetration and SHG-Bank Linkage Programme: A 
Critique, RBI Occasional Papers, Vol. 29 (3), pp. 119 – 138. 
Sreekandaradhya, B. S. 2004. Banking and Finance: Perceptions on Reforms. New Delhi: 
Deep & Deep Publications Pvt. Ltd.  
  
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
o
. 
o
f 
S
H
G
s 
li
n
k
ed
 t
o
 b
an
k
s 
(l
ak
h
) 
 
Year  
Figure 2: The annual growth trends SHGs covered programme  
Source: Estimated from table 1  
Figure 3: The annual growth trends of Amount disbursed under S-B programme  
 
A
m
o
u
n
t 
d
is
b
u
rs
ed
  
(R
s.
 C
ro
re
) 
 
Year  Source: Estimated from table 1  
 
Figure 4: The annual growth trends of Refinance extended  
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